Mahmood Sariolghalam: An Insider's Look at the Iranian Nuclear Situation

On the evening of April 10th, I had the good fortune to sit in on a speech at Ohio State by one Mahmood Sariolghalam. His credentials are pretty good, click that link for more details. The speech took place at OSU's Mershon Center, before an audience of what I took to be mostly political science faculty and graduate students. He spoke for about 40 minutes regarding his views on the current nuclear situation between Iran and the West. It is rare for Americans to get to meet with and listen to Iranians these days, so it was a great opportunity. The quality of his speech was such that I'd like to do my best to share some of his insights with you.

I don't have an official transcript, but I scribbled notes as best I could for the duration of the speech. What follows is my reconstruction of his speech, which had three basic parts.

History of Iranian Nuclear Development
Iran's nuclear program started in 1975. The instigating factor was a study done by Standford University, which acknowledged that due to the fact that Iran was 1) rapidly developing and 2) home to an increasing population, a nuclear program was justified and would help the developing country into the modern world.

This was due in large part to the fact that Iran had signed the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) in 1968 (ratified in Iran in 1970), and because the Shah's government was on good terms with the West.

In 1976, French and British companies came to Iran to help them build a reactor. Work began in 1976 on a 20,000 Megawatt nuclear power plant in southern Iran. In 1978, a Japanese company also came in to help with the enrichment of Uranium.

When the revolution broke out in 1979, the foreign companies left Iran with their work unfinished. The war with Iraq, which took place from 1980 until 1988, caused an extended break in Iran's nuclear development, but by the 1990's they were ready to resume production. However, there was a different government in place – one not as friendly with the West.

The result was that instead of having Britain, France and Japan come back to finish their work of 10 years prior, Iran sought aid from Russia and China, who were happy to oblige. Thus throughout the 1990's the western media occasionally dropped a few grumbles – "Iran is pursuing a secret nuclear weapons agenda…" – but it was never treated as any sort of a serious threat.

It is important to note that no distinction is made between civilian nuclear technology and nuclear weapon technology. For most purposes, the two are treated as interchangeable – the reason being that once you have the resources for one, you can modify them and begin the other within something like 4 months, maybe less. There is no hard line between a "peaceful nuclear program" and a "nuclear weapon program," and this lack of distinction is constantly in play.

In September of 2002, the IAEA declared that Iran's nuclear enrichment program was bigger than it had to be for simple civilian purposes. This led to increased suspicions in the West that perhaps Iran's nuclear program was indeed geared for more than just power plants – however, in 2002 and even today we know that Iran is still a long way from functional civilian nuclear capability, let alone the slightly more advanced nuclear weapon technology.

So What's the Problem Now?
The basic problem with Iran's nuclear program is not technical, legal, or institutional – it is strictly political.

Iran is culturally, economically, and commercially integrated with the rest of the world. However, in terms of security, they are totally isolated – and as a result (or, this is a result of…?), the leadership focuses on a more internal approach to national security.

It is helpful to draw a comparison to China, another large post-Revolutionary country. Both countries were humiliated by repeated Western incursion into their domain.

Revolutions, then, led to consolidations geared towards self-sustainability. In China, they developed socially but they also guided their post-revolutionary framework economically and internationally. They had a handful of intellectuals and leaders who were able to channel the revolutionary energy into sustainable economic and political policies, and in so doing they were able to forge a niche for China as a part of the world stage.

Iran, however, lacked those sorts of experts. The reform brought about by the revolution did not lead to directed changes in economics, but rather to a new focus on internal management of national security. Iran is now run by 1st generation revolutionaries. They lack leadership which is savvy in terms of international relations and economics – this gives the impression that all of Iran is sort of reactionary and revolutionary, but this isn't true. It is the nation's leadership that is revolutionary – the populace is not.

In the 1980s, Iran was an offensive revolutionary power. All revolutions try to some degree to impose their worldview not only on the country they are overthrowing but on the outside world as well, and this led to a very aggressive stance. This has changed – Iran is no longer so offensive and aggressive about its revolutionary policies. Rather, they are defensive.

Nevertheless, Iran still exerts a strong influence over other countries in the region. It is this influence in the middle east that acts as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis relations with the US – Iran is able to exert a sort of constant threat of destabilization in the region, but does not exercise it. This leads to a sort of equilibrium where they are able to maintain their position.

One question frequently raised is, why is ok for India (which has not signed the NPT) and Pakistan (which is led by a military dictator) to have nuclear arms, while Iran cannot? There are two factors at play when a country is about to become a nuclear power. The world looks at their capability and their intentions. India and Pakistan certainly have some issues, but by and large both their capability and their generally good intentions are transparent. Iran, however, due to its deeply internal approach to national security, lacks transparency in terms of intentions.

Moreover, there is a complicating element: the leadership of Iran periodically makes inflammatory overtures towards Israel, which is perceived for such purposes as a representative of The West, albeit within striking distance. So, if Iran seeks nuclear capability but makes threats against Israel, a gap opens up between capability and intention – in other words, it becomes a political issue.

Iran insists on its right to a civilian nuclear program, and the West is not denying this right – however, given the aforementioned blurry border between civilian nuclear capability and military nuclear capability, there needs to be an increase in transparency regarding Iran's actual intentions.

Again, Iran is a developing nation with a growing population. Iran's population is projected to reach 100 million people by 2018. Right now, 71% of the population is under 30. That's a huge number, and this demographic is doing what 20-somethings around the world do – they are looking for work and stability in an increasingly globalized world. ½ of Iran's oil production is consumed internally, and these factors have led many experts to argue that it would be better for Iran to diversify its natural resources. (Myk's Note: I'm not entirely sure what this paragraph really means)

What it boils down to is that the revolution is evolving – soon the 2nd generation will be in charge, nationalism is emerging, and in general everything in Iran is changing. The foreign policy is currently rhetorical and revolutionary – but the economic policy, which is free of the influence of the revolutionary leaders, continues to be progressive and open to international participation. Once the Foreign Policy and the Economic Policy are in line, things will be much more stable and it will be a lot easier to deal with these issues.

For now, though, the relationship between Iran and the US is dictated by, essentially, a lack of relationship – they have no diplomatic channels open, and their every interaction is characterized by distrust and rhetoric. Iran has called the US the "Great Satan," and the US has labeled Iran as a member of the "Axis of Evil." Obviously, none of this helps.

Potential Outcomes

1. Iran will agree to a long-term (10+ year) suspension of its enrichment program. Why 10 years? Because there is a good chance that within that time all of the change boiling on the horizon will come to pass, and a much more moderate/progressive government will replace the first generation revolutionaries. This will naturally lead to a much less complex nuclear dialogue between Iran and the West, and is basically the ideal outcome. If this happens, there is hope for a complete resolution.
2. Iran will refuse the 10+ year suspension, insisting instead of something like 2 years. Within those two years, they will work to improve relations and try to increase transparency regarding their intentions, to ease the process. This is a problematic outcome – the US, in closing diplomatic channels with Iran, has essentially "outsourced" its Iran Nuclear Policy to Europe. If Iran insists on a 2-year suspension, this will lead to a crisis – not only will Bush still be in power in 2 years, but so will the current French, German and British governments. None of these leaders want to simply postpone the problem until later into their administration – they want a resolution.

   If this comes to pass, will it lead to a military crisis? Possibly. This would take place in the near future, within a few years, and would be contingent on how domestic US policies work out and also on what happens in Iraq. If the US attacks, even through minor surgical bombing, it will lead to war. If Israel attacks, it will be treated as though the US has attacked. In any case, regardless of how such a conflict would start it would almost certainly take place with Iraq as the primary battlefield.

   This is the absolute worst outcome – in the event of a war, the progressive populace would circle the wagons, as it were, and run to their leadership for protection. This would increase the revolutionary/reactionary zeal of the Iranian government and spread it throughout the otherwise cosmopolitan populace, leading to a much less desirable social composition.

3. A temporary solution will be reached through compromise. This would likely take the form of an extended suspension of nuclear activities in return for economic/technical benefits. But the bottom line here is politics – both between US/Israel and Iran, and within Iran itself.

The Iranian leadership here could stand to learn from Richard Nixon. A man whose anti-communist sympathies were beyond question, he managed to negotiate a working relationship with Communist China. It is essential.

The bottom line is that given enough time the situation in Iran will change such that the nuclear question is no longer such a cataclysmic issue. However, for that to happen we need to allow this time to pass. This is not a problem that can be solved quickly, and most certainly not a problem that can be solved with mutual rhetoric and baiting.

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